In June of 2010, the Government Accountability Oce (GAO) released a comprehensive evaluation of the eects of full public funding in Arizona and Maine. The report seeks to evaluate the policy eects of public funding in the states with regard to several stated goals of its supporters, including slower campaign spending growth, diminished interest group inuence, enhanced political participation, and heightened electoral competitiveness. The GAO's paper is timely considering that full funding programs are becoming both more common and more visible to the public at large; however, its analysis of public funding is not comprehensive.
In June of 2010, the Government Accountability Oce (GAO) released a comprehensive evaluation of the eects of full public funding in Arizona and Maine, entitled Campaign Finance Reform:
Experiences of Two States That Oered Full Public Funding for Political Candidates (GAO 1), as well as a complimentary methodological appendix (GAO 2). The report seeks to evaluate the policy eects of public funding in the states with regard to several stated goals of its supporters, including slower campaign spending growth, diminished interest group inuence, enhanced political participation, and heightened electoral competitiveness. The GAO's paper is timely considering that full funding programs are becoming both more common and more visible to the public at large; however, its analysis of public funding is not comprehensive. Moreover, its ndings in some areas are not suciently robust. These shortcomings are generally resultant of unnecessary limitations that GAO researchers place on their data, an apparent inattentiveness to existing academic practice, and improper methodological choices.
That said, the GAO's analysis does contain several interesting ndings, and its publication marks a good opportunity for political scientists and policy analysts to compare notes. Combining the contributions from each provides a more complete picture of what is known and unknown in the study of publicly funded elections. In this paper, I review the ndings of the GAO report as well as those of a growing number of scholars who have examined the topic. In the sections below, I describe what the GAO, political scientists, and policy analysts have told us about public election funding, as well as opportunities that remain for further research. This essay should therefore be useful both for political scientists and the policy community.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, I briey overview the history and rationale of American public election funding. I then review known ndings of the GAO, political scientists, and policy organizations with regard to the relationship between public funding and a number of factors including campaign spending, candidate participation, interest group inuence, electoral competition, campaign strategy, and voting behavior. Where applicable, I supplement this review with basic analysis of additional data. I close with recommendations for good practices in future public election funding research.
Why Public Funding?
In Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 1976), the Federal Election Campaign Act was contested on the grounds that its mandatory limitations on both the spending of and contributions to Congressional candidates were unconstitutional limitations on speech. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court found that the main element of speech in a political contribution is the expression of support:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undierentiated, symbolic act of contributing (Ibid.).
This logic allowed the Court to uphold the constitutionality of contribution limitations while striking down forced spending limits, since restrictions on candidate spending equate to direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech and are therefore unreasonable restrictions of First Amendment rights (Ibid). However, because candidate participation (and acceptance of spending limits) in the presidential public nancing program is voluntary, it survived constitutional scrutiny.
Nonetheless, for reformers who see money as a nefarious element in American politics, the Buckley decision has forced creativity. Since spending limits cannot be imposed upon candidates, states looking to reduce the role of money in politics must provide candidates with a reason to accept restrictions on their campaign spending. Public funding programs seem to be natural vehicle to this end; not only do subsidies serve as an incentive for candidates to participate, but they also directly address several problems beyond cost ination. Indeed, critics of the prevailing campaign nance system often cite public funding as a panacea of sorts, with the potential to alleviate one or all of at least four major deciencies in American elections: high average costs, low average competition, the appearance of corruption, and the burden that fundraising places on campaigns.
Public election nancing seems like a logical solution to these problems. Candidates opt into programs that include spending limits because they receive a subsidy in exchange. By providing challengers with more money while requiring candidates to spend less overall, public funding programs promise to close spending gaps between challengers and incumbents, reducing the overall cost of elections. Moreover, subsidies diminish candidates' reliance on so-called special interest contributions, reducing the likelihood that interest groups will gain undue inuence over legislative activities. Finally, candidates recognize that subsidies allow them to avoid the dreaded task of fundraising, which also facilitates greater control over the remainder of their campaign time.
Despite their theoretical potential, public funding programs expanded slowly to state legislative elections. In the 1980s and 1990s, a small number of states, including Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, began oering candidates relatively small subsidies that only partially fund their election campaigns. However, in the late 1990s, voters in Maine and Arizona passed ballot referenda to provide candidates for all state oces with subsidies intended to cover the entirety of their campaign costs, beginning in the 2000 election. Connecticut began its own full funding program in 2008. The successful passage of these laws is part of a larger national movement called Clean Money, Clean Elections, currently the most widespread campaign nance reform initiative at the state level.
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Under Clean Elections programs, candidates qualify for full public funding by raising a small amount of money from a predetermined number of individual contributors. Once they prove their viability in this fashion, Clean Elections candidates receive public subsidies sucient to wage an entire primary and/or general contest. In return, participating candidates agree to raise no additional money and to abide by spending limits equal to their subsidy amounts. To encourage participation, candidates running against those who choose to opt out of the program receive matching funds for their opponents' expenditures above the spending limit. The matching funds provisions are intended to guarantee nancial parity for participating candidates in nearly all circumstances. Important details about each state's program are contained in Table 1. [ Eorts to gauge the ecacy of public funding programs have nearly always relied on their ability to address the core problems described above. Generally speaking, when it comes to altering the political landscape, previous analysis demonstrates that the size of the subsidy matters a great deal. Partial funding has shown some promise in slowing spending ination in Wisconsin (Mayer & Wood 1995) , but has proven ineective in New York City municipal elections (Kraus 2006 ) and Minnesota state campaigns (Schultz 2002 ). An early study of Minnesota found that public funds have helped private contributors to gain an aggregate dollar advantage over PACs (Jones and Borris 1985) . However, Schultz (2002) found that Minnesota's partial public subsidies have not actually reduced the spending of PACs, which had simply channeled their money through soft money and lobbyists. Scholars have also found little competitive change in partially-subsidized elections (e.g., The GAO report addresses Clean Elections in Arizona and Maine, and marks the broadest eort to date to answer the crucial question: does full funding work? As I will describe below, there is building evidence that Clean Elections achieves at least some of its reform objectives, and the GAO's wide-ranging evaluation is a welcome eort to contribute to our knowledge of public funding ecacy. Yet, the GAO report suers from problems that aect its substantive ndings in some areas. Generally, these issues stem from an unwillingness of the agency to consider pre-existing data sources, to collect original data, or to fully consider the impact of its methodological choices.
Greater attention to these areas would have substantially strengthened the report's ndings.
That said, the GAO's report does make important contributions in certain areas. Combining those ndings with other studies from the political science and policy communities yields a complete picture of both the state of knowledge on public funding ecacy and opportunities for future research. Moreover, a critique of the methodological issues alluded to above is potentially helpful for researchers, who should be aware that better practices exist. In subsequent sections, I therefore compare the GAO's conclusions in several substantive areas to previous and forthcoming research from political scientists and policy analysts. Where necessary, I supplement this review with new data.
Spending
The GAO report is a welcome addition to the literature on the topic of campaign spending in fully funded environments. Slowing the growth of campaign spending is an oft-repeated goal of public election funding, and political science has devoted surprisingly little attention to an examination of the relationship between public funding and campaign spending levels.
The agency nds that compared to the two elections prior to public funding implementation, spending in Maine House and Senate elections decreased and held steady, respectively (1: 53). The GAO also reports that spending overall has increased in Arizona since 2000 (1: 59), but because it did not obtain spending data from Arizona prior to 2000, the oce is unable to draw conclusions about the possible eect of public funding on campaign costs. However, one positive nding in the GAO report was that spending gaps have narrowed between challengers and incumbents in Maine Table 2 contains overall mean spending levels prior to Clean Elections, compared to overall spending after its implementation as well as post-Clean Elections tabulations of spending by traditional and publicly funded candidate groups.
The comparison reveals that spending in Arizona House and Senate races was signicantly higher in 2000 and beyond; in both houses average spending increased more than $15,000. In the Maine House, spending is down signicantly by about 8% for all three categorizations in publicly funded years. For contested Maine Senate races, neither overall spending nor that of privately nanced candidates diers signicantly after 1998; however, Senate candidates who participated in public funding did spend about 10% less than mean levels before the implementation of Clean Elections.
It is worthwhile to note that spending is higher after 1998 even for Arizona candidates who opted out, and lower for traditionally nanced Maine House candidates. These trends are somewhat curious, and serve as a reminder that Table 2 cannot denitively prove that Clean Elections is solely responsible for uctuations in spending levels. For instance, changes in district boundaries or political conditions for majority parties are also potential causes that cannot be ruled out. However, if Clean Elections has caused higher spending in Arizona and lower spending in Maine, there is a likely statutory explanation. The primary and general election grant amounts to participating candidates are set as the average of candidate spending in the previous two election cycles in Maine, while in Arizona grants to state house candidates for the two election phases initially totaled $25,000 and are not tied to previous spending levels. If the $25,000 grant in Arizona is substantially more than some candidates were able to raise prior to Clean Elections, then it should not be surprising to see spending rise there after the implementation of public funding while spending is at in Maine.
To illustrate this concept, I depict mean candidate spending for contested challengers, incum- spending there in public funding years. Finally, it is worth noting that contrary to the ndings in the GAP report, analysis of WCFP spending data provides little basis to conclude that overall spending has risen in Arizona since the implementation of Clean Elections.
The GAO also aptly includes a description of trends in independent expenditures, which is an oft-overlooked area of campaign nance analysis. To my knowledge, the GAO's eort in this report is the rst to gather information on spending by independent actors. The GAO nds that independent expenditures have grown substantially since 2000, although a considerable spike is apparent in 2004 that may be due to a broadened denition of independent expenditure that occurred in that year (1: 58). While the GAO reports that independent expenditures have increased in Arizona under public funding, its evidence is largely anecdotal, and no conclusions should be drawn regarding independent expenditures in that state. Regardless, public funding in both Arizona and Maine creates dierent incentives for independent groups. A better understanding of independent expenditures would be a welcome addition to the literature on public funding.
Candidate Participation
In presenting frequencies of candidate participation, the GAO report yields several interesting ndings. For example, the GAO nds that participation rates overall more than doubled from 2000 to 2008 in both Arizona (1: 25) and Maine (1: 17). The oce also reports dierential partisan participation, with Democrats more likely to participate in public funding. These conclusions are consistent with those reported in Werner and Mayer (2007) , which predicts that Democratic challengers are more likely to accept public funding in Arizona and Maine, as well as Miller (2010b) , which found that incumbents in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine were more likely to face a publicly funded challenge than their Democratic counterparts. In tandem with studies in the political science literature, the GAO report suggests that the practical eects of public funding on partisan competition may be uneven, and the potential for public funding to yield disproportionate benets for Democrats should be further studied.
The GAO also reports that while participating candidates in Maine were more likely to win (1: The GAO also presents some information with regard to candidate motivation for participating in Clean Elections. However, since the report relies on frequency statistics from groups of 5 interest group representatives and 11 legislative candidates in each state, it is dicult to draw conclusions.
For instance, Table 7 of the report contains frequencies of non-participating Arizona candidates' responses to one of eight reasons for opting out of public funding (1: 28). However, since only 6 of the informants in the GAO study opted out, it is impossible to say with any certainty that the GAO's sample is valid. While the agency does explicitly note in the appendix that its elite candidate interviews cannot be used to generalize candidate opinion as a whole, the tabling of frequencies in this manner is potentially misleading, especially for readers lacking statistical training.
That said, the GAO correctly identies the solicitation of elite opinion as good research practice, since any changes in a post-Clean Elections environment would likely be derivative of altered behavior among such groups. However, in order to make broad claims as to candidate motivation, opinion, and psyche, a better method would have been to deliver a survey instrument to all legislative candidates.
Such an approach has been successfully utilized in studies of candidate behavior and opinion during To determine candidate motivation for opting out of full funding programs, Miller (2010b) reports the results of such a survey of state house candidates in publicly funded states. Of 43 survey respondents in that study who opted out of public funding in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine,
Miller found that about 60% reported ideological opposition to the programs, while about 10% cited the need to raise a large war chest and to raise more than the spending ceiling, respectively. These results suggest that scally conservative candidates are likely to opt out of full funding due to a personal belief in limited government, or to a recognition that participation in conservative districts may invoke the wrath of a conservative electorate.
Further analysis of Miller's survey data yields additional insight into candidates' rationale for participating in public funding. Figure 3 depicts the percentage of 80 traditionally nanced respondents from the partially funded states of Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin who reported opting out for various reasons. Compared to the respondents from Clean Elections states cited above, a similar proportion in the partially funded statesabout 10 percentreported opting out of public funding so that they could amass large sums to preclude competition. However, ideological opposition is weaker in states that oer smaller subsidies than it is in Clean Elections states by a factor of about twothirds; just over 20% of traditional candidates in partially funded states cited ideology as a reason for opting out of public funding. The clear leader in the partially funded states is a concern among candidates that spending limits are insucient, with a majority of traditionally funded candidates citing concerns with spending limits as one reason for opting out. 4 In both full funding and partial funding states, a majority of candidates reported that because they recognize that they will spend less time fundraising, accepting full funding lends them greater exibility over their campaign time. Over 60% of fully funded respondents also cited the desire to avoid accepting donations from interest groups as a motivating factor, as opposed to about one quarter of partially funded respondents. This dierence is not surprising, considering that partially funded candidates must still raise considerable sums from donors. Finally, about 60% of partially funded respondents cited an inability to raise sucient funds from private sources as a reason for accepting public subsidies, compared to about 40% of those from fully funded states.
Probing the mind of candidates in publicly funded states is informative because it sheds light on the likely eects of public funding, including some in areas that have been understudied. Healthy percentages of candidates in both partial and full funding states see public funding as a vehicle for spurring competition, and there is a strong desire among fully funded candidates to avoid entanglements with interest groups. The GAO report rightly examines each of these areas as potential places for observable eects of public funding. However, majorities of both partially and fully funded 4 Survey methodology and data are described at length in Miller (2010a; 2010b). candidates cited the potential for public funding to deliver increased time exibility as a factor in their decision. If public funding changes the way that candidates use their time, as the responses depicted in Figure 4 seem to suggest, then evaluations of public funding should go beyond analysis of competition and interest group strength to less observable areas such as altered candidate strategy and campaign dynamics.
Interest Groups
In eliminating the ability of special interest organizations to contribute to participating candidates, public funding holds great promise to reduce instances of quid pro quo exchanges between interest groups and voters. Indeed, as noted in the previous section, fully funded candidates recognize this potential, citing it as an attractive feature of Clean Elections programs. Yet the topic of interest group activity in publicly funded states has received scant attention in the political science literature.
The GAO report is a welcome exception to this trend. The agency's analysis of interest group power is suboptimal, but its inclusion will hopefully mark the beginning of an extended conversation in the academic and policy communities.
The GAO nds that the perception of interest group inuence has not decreased as a result of public funding. However, its methods on this front are questionable. The GAO relies on a survey of voting-age citizens, asking them whether the public nancing law had greatly or somewhat decreased special interest group inuence (1: 71). The agency restricts its polling sample to respondents who indicated that they were a lot, some, or a little aware of the public funding laws of their states (Ibid.). Unfortunately, allowing respondents to opt in without testing their actual knowledge likely expands the sample beyond realistic dimensions, since previous research has found that a large proportion of citizens actually know very little about public funding even during highly publicized 
Electoral Competition
Analysis of electoral competition in the public funding literature has largely focused on three questions: Whether Clean Elections changes the demographic composition of the candidate pool, whether more candidates are likely to run in fully funded environments, and whether victory margins are narrower when public funding is present. On the topic of demographics, the GAO cites diculty in obtaining information about legislative candidates, and its paper therefore does not engage the question of whether public funding has altered the demographics of the candidate pool in fully funded states. It is worth noting, however, that a great deal of information about candidates and districts is documented in secondary sources or collectible with some eort; candidate information is often obtainable from political parties, web searches, or archival research, and basic demographic analysis at least is not impossible. Malhotra found no evidence of enhanced competition system-wide when public funding became available, but did nd that incumbents saw diminished margins when they were met by a publicly funded challenger. In short, political science has consistently shown that publicly funded challengers perform better on Election Day, but the existing evidence underscores the point that Clean Elections subsidies can only eect competition in paired races where it is present, and then is strongest when the challenger runs with public funding.
On the question of electoral competition, the GAO's analysis nds no change on dichotomous measures of contestedness (1: 41) or incumbent reelection rates in either Arizona or Maine after implementation of Clean Elections (1: 44), but it does report statistically signicant changes in the winner's victory margin in both states during years for which public funding was available (1: 35).
However, I believe that the GAO's methodological approach is awed, and breaks from well-founded practices that previous scholarship establishes. Accordingly, its ndings are less robust than existing studies of competition in the political science literature.
For instance, rather than to follow Malhotra's sensible approach of a multivariate regression controlling for pertinent covariates, the GAO instead opts for a quasi-experiment that examines competitiveness in Arizona and Maine compared to that of four other states each, before and after the 2000 election. Unfortunately, the GAO's design leaves much to be desired. For instance, the agency's researchers do not provide any balance tests demonstrating that the groups are well-paired.
This shortcoming is particularly important considering the fact that the GAO seems to have matched states more on the basis of factors corresponding to their legislative structure, like chamber size, and less on the observable conditions of their legislative elections, such as average candidate spending, partisan balance, typical levels of competition (pre-2000) , and district population. Failure to attend to this distinction results in state pairings at odds with previous work in the political science liter-ature. For instance, while Miller's (2010a) study of matched pairs groups Montana with Maine in a balanced matching design, the GAO pairs Montana to Arizona. Furthermore, despite taking apparent pains to design pairings that should facilitate causal inference, the GAO refuses to attribute the lower victory margins in Arizona and Maine to public funding, citing data limitations and an inability to measure candidate popularity, which its analysts believe is a potential confounding unobserved variable (1:34).
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The GAO's design also fails to properly assign districts to the appropriate treatment condition.
The agency employs a pre-post design that examines mean variable levels in each state, overall, before and after the implementation of public funding. While such an approach may seem to be an intuitive way to gauge the programs' eectiveness, it ignores the political realities of the manner in which public funding is implemented. Because participation is optional, a number of candidates do not participate and so public funding is not present in all legislative races. Indeed, while the GAO reports that nearly all legislative races in Maine saw at least one participating candidate in 2006 and 2008, participation rates are lower in Arizona, and in both states participation has increased dramatically since 2000, when participation rates were much lower (1:32).
It is unreasonable to expect that public funding will have an eect in contests where it is utilized by neither candidate. In focusing on overall measures of concepts like electoral competition without regard to the utilization of public funding in a paired race, the GAO misses a crucial opportunity to build valuable same-state control groups from which to draw causal inference. 
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To gauge the eect of public funding on competition, a single, controlled xed-eects multivariate 9 It is unclear what the GAO means by candidate popularity, and how it would confound such an analysis. It would seem that a perfectly appropriate measure of a candidate's popularity is, essentially, her share of the vote, which is a component of the dependent variable. analysis with victory margin as the dependent variable would likely have served the agency's purpose.
Another approach would be a panel dierence-in-dierences model measuring competitive trends within the same districts before and after Clean Elections. The agency could also have constructed a matching design pairing candidates based on observable characteristics of both the politician and the district, which would have yielded a reliable causal eect on competition. Any of these approaches would have been superior to the GAO's methodological framework. That said, while it does not meet benchmark standards in this area, the GAO has attempted what will hopefully lead to greater eort to draw causal inference on the competition question, and its eorts underscore that a well-conceived quasi-experimental design would mark a solid contribution to our understanding of the relationship between Clean Elections and electoral competition.
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Campaign Strategy and Candidate Behavior
As noted above, a comprehensive survey of candidates has proven useful in yielding generalizable ndings with regard to their motivation for participating in or opting out of public funding. However, such a method could have also yielded insight into the manner in which public funding alters campaign strategy and candidate behavior. A consideration of altered campaign dynamics is crucial in drawing the linkage to political participation, since it is reasonable to believe that factors other than campaign spending should be crucial in driving mass participation. Specically, more people should vote when candidates are able to devote more time to high-quality, personal contact with vot- It is reasonable to expect that in publicly funded elections, more such contact should occur, since fully funded candidates devote signicantly less time to fundraising than their traditionally nanced counterparts (Francia and Herrnson, 2003) . If they do not devote time to fundraising, rational candidates should spend more time interacting with voters, groups, and media. The GAO nds that 4 of the 6 participating candidates that it interviewed from Maine (1:18) and 3 of 5 participating candidates from Arizona (1:27) reported that their acceptance of public funding allowed them to devote more time to voter mobilization. This is generally consistent with the survey data reported above. Miller (2010a) conrms these ndings using a matching design that supports causal inference.
11 By well-conceived, I mean one that could facilitate causal inference.
Miller found that fully funded candidates devoted nearly ten percentage points more of their time to voter interaction, suggesting that Clean Elections imparts substantial eects on the conduct of the campaign.
In a previous round of surveys and interviews with candidates in Arizona, Miller (2008) found that the matching funds provisions of public funding create incentives for pervasive gaming among traditionally nanced candidates. Non-participating candidates who raised more than the statutory spending limit reported a reluctance to raise and spend money during the election, knowing that doing so would result in the issuance of a matching funds check to their publicly funded opponent.
As a result, traditionally funded candidates withheld their nancial activity until the closing days of the election, so that publicly funded candidates would receive matching funds on or after Election 
Mass Political Behavior
The GAO notes that increasing voter participation, as indicated by. . . voter turnout, was a goal of public nancing programs in Maine and Arizona (81). However, it does not clearly state why we might expect increased voter participation during years when public funding was available. If public funding aects voter turnout, we should expect it to do so in a non-uniform fashion, enhancing turnout in legislative districts where it is utilized by at least one candidate. This is certainly true in elections where no statewide candidates are on the ballot, but even in gubernatorial election years, turnout eects are likely to dier depending upon the public funding status of legislative candidates in any given district. Thus, an examination of statewide turnout statistics is unlikely to capture the true casual relationship between public funding and voting turnout. However, this is not to say that public funding has not been a popular reform tool. In fact, the second trend in public funding is that future programs will likely provide direct subsidies to candidates at levels approximating full campaign costs. As noted above, since Arizona and Maine First, on most questions, they should avoid drawing conclusions from an examination of mean variable levels overall, before and after public funding. Since participation is optional, public funding is not deployed in all legislative districts, and should not be expected to aect contests in which no candidate accepts it. An analysis of competition, for example, should compare the margins of publicly funded candidates to those who were privately funded both before the implementation of Clean Elections and after. Indeed, in the context of a dierence-in-dierences model, districts in which no public funding was accepted after Clean Elections provide an important in-state baseline trend, potentially obviating the need to construct control groups from neighboring states. Analysts must consider how the uneven acceptance of public subsidies aects their research design.
Second, future scholarship should continue to focus on the behavior of political elites such as candidates, party leaders, lobbyists, and legislators. Survey methods are a promising means to gain insight into the aggregate behavior and opinions of such actors, but they are not the only appropriate method. Qualitative methods, including elite interviews and content analysis of websites, speeches, and media coverage all hold the potential to bear fruit with regard to the relationship between public funding and the conduct of elections. If public funding aects familiar concepts like electoral competition or campaign spending, it does so by inuencing the behavior of elites. Collection of more and better data from such actors will likely lead to previously undiscovered program eects, and may also enhance our understanding of the causal dynamic underlying existing ndings.
Third, and not fully distinct from the point immediately above, researchers should be willing to search for data that are not readily attainable from centralized state election organizations. The state agencies should not be viewed as the only reliable source of information with regard to candidates, legislative districts, and campaign nance. A number of university and non-prot centers, including the University of Wisconsin's Campaign Finance Project and the National Institute for Money in State Politics, provide reliable secondary sources of nancial information. Moreover, the U.S.
Census Legislative District File as well as at least two almanacs are a valuable source of information on legislative district composition. Finally, the websites and stas of the political parties, local newspapers, and the candidates themselves are useful sources of information that should be betterutilized.
Fourth, as with many questions of policy eectiveness, causality is a crucial element to research design when it comes to the study of Clean Elections. Researchers should design studies that facilitate causal inference, and should be forthcoming with regard to the covariate balance between groups and the sensitivity of their ndings, particularly since candidate funding status is a nonrandom event. As noted above, the uneven application of full funding yields unique opportunities for dierence-in-dierences models that should allow causal conclusions. Well-conceived matching designs also hold promise in a number of areas, including competition, provided that they meet the balance criteria described above. Tables   Table I- accept them. **In Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, candidates are allowed to raise $5,000, $6,000, and $500 prior to qualifying. Once they accept public funding, they may raise no additional money.
